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Questions Presented for Review
Question No. 1: Is it the public policy of the State of Utah to permit a Petitioner
who prevails at the trial on the merits and accepts payment in full of judgment but then
fails to file a satisfaction of judgment to continue to appeal the trial court's decision?
Question No. 2: May a party prosecute a cause of action to establish a marriage
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-1-4.5, when the period of cohabitation terminated
more than one year prior to the commencement of the action?
Reference to Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision in this matter on October 29, 2009.
Statement of Grounds on Which Jurisdiction is Based
This Court should exercise its jurisdiction because the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision regarding the right to continue to maintain an appeal which has so far departed
from what should be the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for
this Court to exercise its supervisory authority in order to establish a clear demarcation of
the public policy of this State concerning both the mandates of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as well as the interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions. The
foregoing statement of grounds is applicable to both of the questions presented.
In addition, the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state law
which has not previously been settled which should be settled by the Supreme Court.
This statement of ground is applicable to both questions presented but most importantly
to the issue of cohabitation in the context of a claim to establish a common law marriage.
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Further, this issue is of importance to both the trial bench ^nd the bar, extending
substantially beyond the mere facts of the instant action.
Controlling Rules and Statutory Provisions
A. Utah Code Provisions
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be legal and
valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of a contract
between a man and a woman who:
(a) are of legal age and capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the
provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and
general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this
section must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within
one year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved
under the same general rules of evidence as facts in pther cases.
B.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment.
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment ltnay be satisfied, in whole or in
part, as to any or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, or by the
attorney of record of the judgment creditor where no assignment of the judgment
has been filed and such attorney executes such satisfaction within eight years after
the entry of the judgment, in the following manner (1) by written instrument, duly
acknowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acknowledgment of such
satisfaction signed by the owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the
judgment in the county where first docketed, with jhe date affixed and witnessed
by the clerk. Every satisfaction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more of
the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid thereon or for the release of such
debtors, naming them.
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgmeiit shall have been fully paid and
not satisfied of record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall have been lost,
the court in which such judgment was recovered may, upon motion and
satisfactory proof, authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to satisfy the
6

same, or may enter an order declaring the same satisfied and direct satisfaction to
be entered upon the docket.
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction of judgment, duly executed and
acknowledged, the clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, and enter it
on the register of actions. He shall also enter a brief statement of the substance
thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of the judgment docket, with the
date of filing of such satisfaction.
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall have been satisfied, in whole or
in part, or as to any judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon the docket
by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent of such satisfaction, be discharged
and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execution shall
thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution shall be endorsed with a
memorandum of such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to collect only
the residue thereof, or to collect only from the judgment debtors remaining liable
thereon.,
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction of a
judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the county where
such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, or a
certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with the clerk of
the district court in any other county where the judgment may have been docketed.
Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be made by the clerk of
such court; and such entry shall have the same effect as in the county where the
same was originally entered.
Statement of the Case
The instant action was to establish the validity of an unsolemnized marriage, for
the entry of a decree of divorce, and claims' for unjust enrichment. At the trial court,
Brown filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the petition to establish an
unsolemnized marriage was untimely. The motion for partial summary judgment was
granted based upon the passage of in excess of one year since the parties cohabitated and
the filing of the original action. Subsequently, a trial was held where the Court found
Brown was unjustly enriched based on capital improvements to a home she owned prior
to her relationship with Richards. After entry of the judgment, Brown paid the judgment
in full, however Richards failed to file a satisfaction of judgment. Richards appealed and
7

the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. I Specifically, the Court of
Appeals reversed deciding the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the motion
for summary judgment holding the element "have cohabited" should be treated
differently than the other elements required to prove an unsolemnized marriage because
that element is written in the past tense in contrast to the present tense of the majority of
the other elements of UCA §30-1-4.5. Brown petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari
on two issues which petition was granted.
Statement of Facts
Richards commenced this action by filing a Verified Petition for Paternity and
Related Matters on December 21, 2006. (R. 1-8). In the \|(erified Petition for Paternity
and Related Matters, Richards alleged in the relevant part: the parties had never been
married (R. 1); the parties continually resided together for over 10 years seeking an order
establishing a common law marriage pursuant to UCA §30-1-4.5 (R. 3); the parties
cohabitated from May 1995 until their separation in early j>006 (R. 3); the parties are both
of legal age and capable of giving consent (R. 3); and the parties have held themselves
out and acquired a reputation as husband and wife (R. 4). Based thereon Richards sought
to establish a common law marriage and for the entry of appropriate orders concerning
custody, child support and property divisions. (R. 4-5). On January 10, 2007, Brown
filed her Answer to the Verified Petition for Paternity and Related Matters. (R. 28-38).
In her Answer, Brown responded to the allegations in the relevant part, by:
admitting the parties were never married (R. 28); affirmatively denying that the parties
8

separated in early 2006, alleging the parties separated in August, 2005 and therefore do
not meet the cohabitation element for the establishment of a common law marriage (R.
29); and a denial of all relief requested by Richards relating to any property and
affirmatively alleging there was no property to be divided (R. 30).
On August 8, 2007, Brown filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relating
to whether Richards timely filed his petition for the establishment of a common law
marriage. (R. 72-81). On August 8, 2007, Brown filed her Affidavit of Diana Brown in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, wherein she alleged: she purchased
the home on 459 12th Avenue in December, 1989. (R. 82); she and Richards began
residing together in May, 1995. (R. 82); they cohabitated until the summer of 2001 when
they moved into separate bedrooms and completely terminated all sexual relations with
one another. (R. 83); Richards moved out of the residence at the end of August, 2005 and
took up residence at 635 K Street where he continued to reside. (R. 83); and the Verified
Petition filed in December, 2006 was more than one year after they separated in August,
2005. (R. 83).
On September 5, 2007, Richards filed his Response to Respondent's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 87-93). Richards did not file an affidavit in support of
his Response to Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On September 5,
2007, the Honorable Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett recommended that the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment be granted. (R. 94). On September 10, 2007, Richards filed
his Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation. (R. 95-99). On October 15, 2007,
9

the Court entered its Order on Motion for Partial Summary [Judgment. (R. 110-113). On
January 9, 2008, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision on Richards Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation, thereby denying the objection. (R. 121-123). In the
Memorandum Decision, the Court relied on Haddow v. Haddow, 101 P.2d 669 (Utah
1985) for a definition of "cohabitation" which included common residency and sexual
contact evidencing a conjugal association. The Court found that it was undisputed that
the parties terminated all sexual contact in 2001 and Richards moved out of the residence
in September, 2005. The Court found Richards had one year from the date of the
termination of the relationship to file his Petition and his petition was not timely filed.
(R. 121-123). On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided that with respect to the element
of cohabitation, it was not necessary that the parties' cohabitated within one year of the
filing of the Petition to establish a common law marriage, but rather based on the past
tense of the phrase a Petitioner need only allege the fact oi[ cohabitation, reversing the
trial court's grant of summary judgment. (Court of Appeals Decision, P.9-11).
The action came before the Court on a bench trial on June 16, 2008, with all trial
exhibits presented to the Court based on stipulation and thb parties as the only witnesses
testifying. (R. 225-226). Both Richards and Brown testified . There were a number of
disputed issues, but most significantly was Richards claini to an entitlement to equity in
the house Brown owned prior to the commencement of her relationship with Richards.
(Tr. P. 15, L. 4-10). Richards testified that over the course of the parties' relationship, he
paid a pro-rata share of the mortgage payments and other Expenses. (Tr. P. 26, L. 1-4; P.
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26, L. 5-10; Tr. P. 28, L. 1-5 and P. 67, L. 9-12). In addition, Richards testified that he
contributed money to improvements to the property, including the construction of a deck.
(Tr. P. 46, L. 3-25).
After taking the matter under advisement, on July 9, 2008, the Court issued its
Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 228-251). The Court entered
detailed Findings of Fact including but not limited to: (a) The parties never married but
began living together in 1995 and a daughter was born on March 29, 1996. (R. 228,
Finding #1); (b) The parties separated in August 2005 when Richards moved out of the
house and rented an apartment six blocks away, paying a monthly rent of $750 per
month. (R. 229, Finding #3); and (c) While Richards presented evidence which was not
disputed that he paid $71,100 in monthly payments toward the mortgage, $960.03 in
home maintenance, $1,024.50 in lawn service, and $12,470 in other house expenses, the
majority of which related to nearly $9,000.00 to construct a deck, in most cases the Court
could not discern whether those expenses were incurred for household improvements, or
simply involved other expenses not related to an improvement to the house. (R. 239,
Finding #27).
Based on the complete findings, the Court entered the following Conclusions of
Law: (a) the home was clearly "premarital property" belonging to Brown. (R. 241,
Conclusion #30); (b) The parties never married, so there is no "marital estate" to divide.
When the parties resolved the custody related issues and the Court granted partial
summary judgment on the common law marriage claim, the case lost its character as a
11

"domestic" case. However, because Richards asserted civil claims, the case proceeded to
trial. In closing argument, Richards abandoned all claims ixcept unjust enrichment and
promissory estoppel. (R. 241-242, Conclusion No. 31); (c) Richards is not entitled to any
share of equity in the home, although the Court found he did set forth a claim for unjust
enrichment. (R. 242, Conclusion No. 32); (d) After setting forth the elements of a claim
for unjust enrichment, the Court concluded that the evidence supported a claim of unjust
enrichment for the amount paid for the new deck ($8,895.00) and it would be unjust to
permit Brown to retain that benefit without paying the cosi thereof. (R. 242-243,
Conclusion #33); (e) In addition, the Court made the same finding with respect to the
costs incurred for the purchase and installation of the swamp cooler ($750.00), sprinkler
system expenditures ($312.00), and the purchase of a ceiling fan ($179.00) finding the
total amount by which Brown was unjustly enriched to be $10,136.00. (R. 243,
Conclusion #34); and (f) With respect to any other amounts, the Court found Richards
failed to meet his burden of proof. (R. 243, Conclusion #2f 5).
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of ^aw, the Court entered the
following Order: (a) Petitioner's counsel was to prepare ai[id submit for the Court's
signature a final order and Determination of Paternity pursuant to the parties' stipulation,
(R. 250, Order #47); and (b) With respect to all other issues addressed in this decision,
the Court's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order shall be the final Order of the
Court and no other form of order will need to be submitted by counsel. (R. 250, Order
#48). Brown paid Richards the sum of $10,136.00 as ordered by the Court. Despite
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having accepted payment in full, Richards never filed a satisfaction of judgment in the
trial court.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied Brown's argument the appeal was
rendered moot by accepting payment because no satisfaction of judgment was filed with
the trial court. See Court of Appeals Decision, P. 4-5, Footnote 9. In addition, it found
that because UCA §30-1-4.5 was written such that the elements were not of the same
tense; each element should be treated differently. Thus, the trial court could not conclude
as a matter of law the parties relationship terminated when they ceased cohabiting.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law when it concluded that a party does
not waive their right to appeal when they accept the benefits of a judgment but fail to file
a satisfaction of judgment. While a satisfaction of judgment provides notice to the world
the judgment has been paid, it provides no notice to the parties to the action who are
respectively judgment creditor and judgment debtor. Permitting a judgment creditor to
benefit from their own dilatory failure to file a satisfaction of judgment is bad public
policy which encourages both noncompliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
sharp practice to gain a financial advantage through tactical chicanery.
In addition, the Court of Appeals eifed in interpreting Utah Code Annotated §301-4.5. The Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion the elements are written in different
tenses thereby requiring a different treatment to the various elements of the statute. The
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Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that an action may I be filed more than one year
after the parties ceased cohabiting and nonetheless be timely under the statute of repose.
The Court of Appeals erred in remanding the action to the Trial court when there are no
disputed issues of material fact. In such case, whether the parties ceasing to cohabit
effectuated a termination of their relationship for purposes of the statute of repose must
be decided as a matter of law. Lastly, this Court should take this opportunity to provide
guidance to both the bench and the bar regarding the elements necessary to establish an
unsolemnized marriage, the proofs required, as well as their application to the statute of
repose.
ARGUMENT

It is bad public policy to permit a judgment creditor to accept the benefits of a judgment
yet maintain an appeal simply by failing to file a satisfaction of judgment.
On appeal, Brown argued the appeal was moot based on her voluntary payment of
the judgment and the acceptance thereof by Richards. In {footnote 9 of its decision, the
Court of Appeals stated:
Brown argues that because she has voluntarily paid the judgment and Richards has
accepted it, the controversy is moot and Richards Was waived his right to appeal.
See generally Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143
(1973)(discussing general rule of mootness and waiver of appeal once judgment
has been voluntarily satisfied). We reject Brown's argument because although
Richards does not dispute he received payment, there is no satisfaction of
judgment in the record. See Hollingsworth v. Farmers Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 637, 639
(Utah 1982)(requiring the execution of a satisfaction of judgment to moot a
controversy).
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See Decision attached hereto in the Appendix. Brown believes it is simply bad public
policy to permit a judgment creditor to accept the benefits of a judgment yet maintain an
appeal by failing to file a satisfaction of judgment. Such a policy encourages playing fast
and loose with the rules in order to secure every conceivable tactical advantage and
effectuates a shifting of the burden of risks which is proscribed by Utah law.
As appropriately noted by the Court of Appeals, the general rule of mootness after
accepting voluntary payment of a judgment is set forth in Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d
154, 514P.2d 1142, 1143 (1973). In Jensen, the Court stated the general rule is that "if a
judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, and a judgment satisfied, the controversy
has become moot and the right to appeal is waived." Id. At 157. The judgment is
satisfied when paid, not when the satisfaction of judgment is filed with the Court.
Interpreting the plain words using their plain meaning, Black's Law Dictionary defines
"satisfaction" as meaning:
Act of satisfying; the state of being satisfied. Seago v. New YorkR. Co., 349 Mo.
1249, 164 S.W.2d 336, 341. The discharge of an obligation by paying a party
what is due him (as on a mortgage, lien, note, or contract), or what is awarded to
him, by the judgment of a court or otherwise. Thus, a judgment is satisfied by the
payment of the amount due to the party who has recovered such judgment, or by
levying the amount. . . .
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (1991)[emphasis supplied]. Thus, when Brown paid the
judgment, it was satisfied.
While the Court of Appeals recognized a requirement of the execution of a
satisfaction of judgment to moot a controversy based on Hollingsworth v. Farmers Ins.
Co., 655 P.2d 637, 639 (Utah 1982), this ministerial requirement does not alter the fact
15

the judgment was satisfied as between the parties but rathe^r provides notice to third
parties that such satisfaction has occurred. To hold otherwise exalts form over substance
as between the parties and ignores the import of imparting Notice to the parties to the
action.
The filing of the satisfaction of the judgment doe^ not alter the reality of full
payment of the judgment by the judgment debtor and its acceptance by the judgment
creditor. The filing of the satisfaction of the judgment doe|s however alter the state of
notice as to third parties. The satisfaction of judgment equates to an official receipt. See
Istric v. Norcon Elecs., Inc., 00146892, 2005 NY Slip Op £0677 (5/9/05). When filed
with the clerk of the court, it imparts notice to the worldtibfatthere is no longer an
outstanding judgment. Id.
There are other provisions in Utah which impart Notice to the world without
impacting the rights as between the parties. For instance, the recordation of document of
conveyance constitutes notice to the world of the existence of the conveyance. See e.g.
Huffakerv. First Nat'l Bank of Brigham City, 52 Utah 31^, 173 P. 903, 904 (1918).
Recording does not however alter the interests of the parties to the conveyance. See Utah
Code Ann. § 57-3-102(3) (Supp. 1998); Crowther v. Mow^r, 876 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah
Ct.App.), cert, denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994); See al$o Gregerson v. Jensen, 669
P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1983). Thus, where the purpose of alnotice provision is designed to
provide notice to the world, but does not impact the rights| of the parties to the
proceeding, the provision of notice does not alter the substantive rights of the parties to
whom no notice is imparted.
16

The acceptance of the benefit doctrine waives the right to appeal as a matter of
long standing Utah law. In Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987) the Court
quoted Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 P. 1117, 1118
(1920), for the proposition that where "a party to an action accepts the benefits of a
judgment in his favor or acquiesces in a judgment against him he thereby waives his right
to have said judgment reviewed on appeal[.]ff
The concept of waiver of appeal is also described as the "acceptance-of-benefit"
doctrine. As noted by the Court in Trees, supra, this doctrine invokes a significant shift
in the burden of risk. The Trees court stated, "An appellant who accepts the benefits of a
judgment from which he is appealing accomplishes a significant shift in the burden of
risk; he exposes the respondent to the possibility not only to a possible loss on appeal, but
also the potential loss of the benefit he has provided to the appellant." Trees at 614. The
Trees court foreshadowed precisely what occurred in the instant case. Brown voluntarily
paid the judgment. Thereafter, not only did she lose a significant portion of the appeal
resulting in remand and further litigation, but also the loss of benefit she provided to
Richards. The very purpose of the "acceptance-of-benefit" doctrine has been gutted by
the imposition of a procedural condition precedent which in no way alters the factual
reality of the post judgment actions of the parties nor the actual satisfaction of the
judgment. Rather, it tips the scales of equity in favor of a judgment creditor who may
accept the benefits of the judgment and continue to appeal based on his own failure to
diligently comply with his duties and responsibilities to the judgment debtor and under
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the rules of civil procedure. In the instant case, the judgment was satisfied, the benefit
accepted, and Richards waived his right to appeal the judghient.
To permit a judgment creditor to accept the benefits of the judgment not only
effectuates a shift of risks, but also encourages sharp practice and tactical chicanery.
"[The rules of civil procedure] must all be looked to in the |light of their even more
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the
parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they
have pertaining to their dispute." Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Ut^h 2d 205, 211,381 P.2d 86,
91 (1963). However, in so liberalizing both pleading and procedure, the focus remains
on insuring procedures and process which "effect total faii)ness for all parties in a suit."
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 313 (Utah App. 1992). Ms set forth in Rule 1, Utah R.
Civ. Pro.,
They shall be liberally construed to secure tfye just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.
Id. Clearly, with a focus on both orderly proceedings whibh protect due process by
insuring fairness in the proceedings.
It is unquestionable, that a policy which encourages the violation of the spirit if
not the letter of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and endourages conduct which
discourages the just determinations of the action is simpl^ bad public policy. To hold
otherwise will sanction judgment creditors to shirk their responsibility under Rule 5 8 A,
Utah R. Civ. Pro., to gain both the benefit of payment of ^he judgment while contesting
the benefits retained.

18

This Court should clarify the import of a satisfaction of judgment. While its
filing provides notice to third parties, it does not alter the factual reality between the
parties. The satisfaction of judgment does not provide any notice to the parties which
was not already imparted by both the payment and acceptance of the judgment sum. If a
judgment creditor accepts the benefits of the judgment, this Court should rule as a matter
of law they have waived their right to appeal that judgment.1 This Court should rule that
Richards waived his right to appeal regardless of his failure to file the satisfaction of
judgment.
II
For purposes of establishing a common law marriage and clarity of the applicable
standards, the action should be filed within one year of the termination of cohabitation
In a grammarian exercise, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment, not based on questions of fact, but because it determined Brown was
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, the Court of Appeals
complicated an already complex, fact specific standard, by interpreting Utah Code
Annotated §30-1-4.5 to require only that the parties cohabited at some distant time in the
past, but not within one year of the filing of the Petition to establish a valid unsolemnized
marriage. This Court should take this opportunity, for the benefit of both the bench and

1

The Appellant is not suggesting that the exceptions to the right to appeal collateral
matters which are not altered by the payment of the judgment should be abrogated.
However, the mere technicality of the failure to file a satisfaction of judgment by the
party responsible to do so should not vitiate their waiver of the right to appeal the benefit
accepted.
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the bar, to clarify the precise requirements to establish a cotnmon law marriage within the
required statute of repose, including therein the effect of termination of cohabitation.
The Court of Appeals determined the statute of repose under the act is triggered
by the termination of the relationship. (Decision, f23). Tl^e parties admitted they had
cohabited. (Decision, ^25). The Court of Appeals decided! under the terms of the statute
this is all that is required, effectively holding the terminati0n of cohabitation did not as a
matter of law result in the termination of the relationship a? required to trigger the statute
of repose. Id. Rather, the Court concluded that Richards \^as entitled to present evidence
that despite his no longer residing with Brown, the relatioriship continued after the
termination of cohabitation. Id.
The Court of Appeals analyzed the relevant statute UCA §30-1-4.5. Citing to
Utah Dep yt of Transp. V. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ^[22, the Couift correctly stated, "Our
primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the| legislative intent as evidenced
by the plain language in light of the purpose the statute w^s meant to achieve." Court of
Appeals Decision, f23. It then properly attempted to readlthe elements contained in UCA
§30-1-4.5 in light of the statute of repose, concluding the Express language of the statute
anticipates a different treatment for some of those elementts. Id.
In support of this conclusion, the Court of Appeals then parsed out the statute,
concluding the elements involved the use of different verb tenses. Id. at ^[25. The Court
of Appeals found that while elements (a) ["are of legal ag^ and capable of giving
consent"] and (b) ["are legally capable of entering into a solemnized marriage under this
chapter"] were present tense, element (c) ["have cohabited"] is written in the past tense.
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Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that as a matter of law the date Richards moved
out does not "determine when the relationship terminated by the failure of one of the
elements required by section 30-1-4.5(1)." Id. Instead, the Court concluded Richards
was entitled to present evidence that despite his having moved out of the home (thereby
terminating the parties' cohabitation) such act did not terminate the relationship. Id.
Brown believes the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the statute both
in terms of the manner in which it diagrammed the sentence as well as its matter of law
conclusion regarding the effect of the undisputed fact of Ricards moving out of Brown's
home. Element (C) is not necessarily written in the past tense. Rather, the phrase "have
cohabited" is most likely written in the present perfect tense. The word "have" is an
auxiliary verb coupled with the past participle "cohabited." Two examples highlight the
difference between the past tense and the present perfect tense. The sentence
"The parties cohabited for five years."
is written in the past tense, without the benefit of an auxiliary verb. The act of
cohabitation is presumed complete and concluded. In contrast, the following sentence,
written in the present perfect tense contemplates a continuation of the act of cohabitation
in the present tense:
"The parties have cohabited for five years."
In this second example, the act of cohabitation may not yet have concluded. The use of
the auxiliary verb "have" coupled with the past participle "cohabited" denotes the present
perfect tense.
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Generally, effective writing contemplates a parallelism in tense. Arguably, the
legislature would, whenever possible, make all of the dependent clauses {i.e. the elements
necessary to establish an unsolemnized marriage) agree in tense. Thus, the proper
grammatical conclusion is the element "have cohabited" is | written in the present perfect
tense, not the past tense.
The rules of statutory construction are well established under Utah law. First,
the various parts of a section are to be read together. Lund\ v. Brown, 2000 UT 75,
f 23, 11 P.3d 277. A statute should not be read in piecemeal but rather as a
comprehensive whole. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 80S P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991).
This Court should interpret a statutes provisions in harmony with other statutes in the
same chapter and related chapters. See State v. Schofield, J2002 UT 132, f 8, 63 P.3d 667,
cert, denied, 540 U.S. 820, 124 S.Ct. 104, 157 L.Ed.2d 391(2003). Finally, statutory
interpretation should "avoid interpretations that will rendet portions of a statute
superfluous or inoperative." Hall v. Utah State Dep't ofCc^rr., 2001 UT 34, f 15,
24P.3d958.
Having determined the elements in UCA §30-l-4).5(l) are all written in the
present tense, the elements in subsection (1) must be read ^n conjunction with the
requirements of subsection (2). UCA §30-1-4.5(2) states,
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur
during the relationship described in Subsection (1)J or within one year following
the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under
this section may be manifested in any form, and m^y be proved under the same
general rules of evidence as facts in pther cases.
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Id. In order to give complete effect to the statute of repose contained in subsection (2),
the required elements contained in subsection (1) must be read together with the statute of
repose.
The Court of Appeals correctly found that to establish a valid unsolemnized
marriage, no one element is given greater weight than another, but rather all elements
must be proven. Court of Appeals Decision, f 20. Thus, one can better understand the
inter-relationship between the elements set forth in subsection (1) and the statute of
repose set forth in subsection (2) through a simple exercise of "redrafting" the elements
and statute of repose as one. By way of example, redrafted conjunctively for each
element, the first sentence of subsection (2) reads:
•

•

•

•

•

The determination or establishment that the parties are of legal age and capable
of giving consent must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1),
or within one year following the termination of that relationship. [Subsection
(l)(a) and 2 combined];
The determination or establishment that the parties are legally capable of
entering into a solemnized marriage under this chapter must occur during the
relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following the
termination of that relationship. [Subsection (l)(b) and 2 combined];
The determination or establishment that the parties have cohabited must occur
during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following
the termination of that relationship. [Subsection (l)(c) and 2 combined];
The determination or establishment that the parties have mutually assume
marital rights, duties and obligations must occur during the relationship described
in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of that relationship.
[Subsection 1(d) and 2 combined]; and
The determination or establishment that the parties hold themselves out as and
have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife must occur
during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following
the termination of that relationship. [Subsection 1(e) and 2 combined].

In a case filed to establish an unsolemnized marriage which includes a claim for a divorce
upon such a finding, each of these elements must have existed within one year of their
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termination or the statute of repose is rendered a nullity. Ctearly, any interpretation to the
contrary ignores both the plain language of the statute as w^ll as the legislative intent
which is expressed only in the chosen language.
The Court of Appeals creates a standard which is }iow more complicated and
difficult to apply than ever before. By way of example onl^, in the instant case, the
parties had a child together. Because of their mutual desir^ to remain involved in the
child's life, the parties continue to have a relationship witW one another, albeit a "divorcelike" rather than "marriage-like" relationship. Clearly, while their relationship evolved, it
did not entirely terminate, nor will it ever. Thus, under th^ Court of Appeals standard,
Richards would have the right to put on evidence of the relationship's continuation and
argue its evolved continuation. However, in a clear statement, in Walters v. Walters, 812
P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991), footnote 2, the Court stated, "Section 30-1-4.5 recognizes a
marriage relationship between cohabitants if the relationship satisfies certain specified
requirements." Id. [emphasis supplied]. Thus, when the pjarties permanently cease
cohabiting, the relationship as a matter of law is terminate^, commencing the statute of
repose to run.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals standard contravenes the very purposes
previously found regarding the statute of repose as applied to common law marriage. In
In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ^f 25, 1 P.3d 10^4, this Court recognized
that the one-year statute of limitations in section 30-1-4.5 ^s meant to "protect parties who
never meant to be statutorily married from adjudications [bf marriage] many years after
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their relationship has ended." Yet despite this declaration from this Court, the Court of
Appeals standard specifically invites such belated adjudications.
There are undoubtedly more concrete standards which provide a measure of
certainty to both the bench and the bar. In Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538, the
Court held the date of permanent separation constituted the date of termination of the
relationship. In other jurisdictions, the cohabitation requirement is one of "continuing
cohabitation." See e.g. Warner v. Layland, 770 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa App. 2009) and
Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 552 Pa. 253, 261-62, 714 A.2d 1016, 1020 (1998).
Undoubtedly, there are circumstances where the parties have not terminated their
relationship albeit they are not residing under the same roof at all times. See Winfield v.
Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640, 646-48 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1991, writ denied)
(concluding evidence of cohabitation sufficient when man only spent about 100 days with
woman in two years); see also Ballesteros v. Jones, 985 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex.App.-San
Antonio 1998, writ denied) (concluding that evidence sufficient to establish cohabitation
element between man, a Mexican national whose permanent residence was in Nuevo
Laredo, and woman, even though man split time between homes); Bolash v. Heid, 733
S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ) (holding that evidence that man,
employed in Nigeria, stayed at woman's residence during his periodic visits to Texas was
sufficient to support finding that they lived together as husband and wife "to the extent
possible under the circumstances"). However, the instant case does not present similar
facts. The undisputed facts are that Richards moved out of the house in August, 2005 and
never again resided therein, instead he rented his own place six blocks away. (R. 229,
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Finding #3). In August, 2005 there was a permanent separation which effectuated the
termination of the parties' relationship.
The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the statfute. Because of the broader
application to both the bench and bar in an area of law whi^h has scant precedent and for
which the standards are confusing at best, this Court should take this opportunity to
provide guidance and clarity. However, in so doing, it should not remand this matter
back to the trial court to take evidence as ordered by the Ci>urt of Appeals. The facts are
undisputed. Richards permanently moved out of Brown's Residence in September, 2005.
Court of Appeals Decision, ^|17. Under the undisputed fadts of this case, the parties
"cohabitation" terminated on that undisputed date. However, he did not file his action to
determine or establish the existence of the alleged unsolenjmized marriage until
December 21, 2006. (R. 1-8). Thus, as a matter of law hi^; action fails because the
element of cohabitation terminated more than one year prit>r to filing his action.
This Court should adopt a rule which provides th^ statute of repose commences
to run from the permanent termination of the parties' cohabitation. There is precedent to
support this interpretation of the statute. In Clark v. Clarl^ 2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538 this

2

This terminated the parties "marriage like" and conjugal Relationship, however it did not
terminated their "divorce-like" custodial relationship as they share a child in common and
admirably both are actively involved in that child's life. Thus, it should be expected they
will continue to have a divorce-like custodial relationship throughout the minority of the
child and for the sake of both parties, hopefully as long as they live as it relates to their
child and her progeny. This evolved relationship is irrele\pant to the determination of
when their relationship for purposes of establishing an un^olemnized marriage
terminated.
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Court affirmed the finding of the trial court that the date of the termination of a common
law marriage was the date "when a final separation occurred." Id. at 540, 543. In Clark,
the Court found ample evidence supporting the date of separation as the date of
termination of the relationship, clearly a finding based on disputed facts. Obviously, if
the facts are in dispute, they must be resolved through a full evidentiary review.
However, where the facts are not in dispute, the Court can rule as a matter of law whether
an undisputed permanent separation and termination of cohabitation resulted in the
termination of the relationship for purposes of the running of the statute of repose. In the
instant case, there simply is no doubt the termination of cohabitation constituted the
termination of the parties' relationship for purposes of triggering the statute of repose.
In the instant case, this Court has an opportunity to provide clarity to a vague
and confusing statute. This is the opportunity for this Court to provide both the bench
and bar with a workable standard which clearly defines when a relationship terminates
for purposes of the statute of repose running as well as the evidentiary requirements for
establishing that termination. The rule established by the Court of Appeals is
unworkable, overly complicated and invites the very circumstances which the precedence
of this State define as the very purpose of the statute of repose. After having provided
such clarity and guidance, however under the facts of this case this Court should rule as a
matter of law the undisputed facts when applied to the law mandate the conclusion the
relationship terminated in September, 2005 when Richards permanently moved out of
Brown's residence. Because he did not file the instant action until December, 2006, the
statute of repose had run.
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Conclusion
Brown respectfully requests this Court to reverse th^ Court of Appeals. First,
Richards appeal was waived by his acceptance of the benefit of the judgment. While the
filing of a satisfaction of judgment may well impact the rights of the parties as to third
parties to the action, it provides no notice which the partie$ to the action did not already
have. The technical requirement of filing a notice of satisfaction should never alter the
judgment creditor's waiver of their right to appeal when th^ burden is upon the judgment
creditor to file that satisfaction of judgment. To hold otherwise is simply bad public
policy.
This Court should reverse the Court of Appeals interpretation of UCA §30-1-4.5.
First, the Court of Appeals improperly diagrammed this section and incorrectly
concluded that subsection (c) is written in the past tense. $econd, this Court needs to
clarify all of the standards related to common law marriagp, most significantly the
interplay of cohabitation and termination of the relationship. Finally, after having
provided both the bench and bar with guidance and clarity regarding both the
interpretation of the statutes and their interplay with the presentation of evidence, this
Court should rule as a matter of law that for purposes of establishing an unsolemnized
marriage, if the action is not filed within one year of the parties ceasing to cohabit, the
action fails as a matter of law. This Court should not remind this action to the trial court,
but should rule that Richards5 action fails as a matter of l^w because it was not timely
filed.
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STATEMENT OF SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUESTED
Brown requests the following relief:
1. Reverse the Court of Appeals decision that waiver does not occur by accepting
the benefits of a judgment but failing to file a satisfaction of judgment and rule
as a matter of law the filing of a satisfaction of judgment is irrelevant to the
issue of waiver of the right to appeal as between the original judgment creditor
and judgment debtor if they were parties to the action in which the judgment
was rendered.
2. Reverse the Court of Appeals decision interpreting when the statute of repose
runs for purposes of establishing1 an unsolemnized marriage when the parties
have ceased cohabiting more thaii one year prior to the action being filed.
3. Provide guidance to the bench and bar regarding Utah's unsolemnized
marriage state in terms of both its elements, proof, and timeliness of filing the
action.

Dated and Signed this<^M_ day of February, 2010.

y* /
Tiaelce Van Dijk
Attorney for Petitioner
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McHUGH, Judge:
%1
Steve Richards appeals the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Diana Brown on Richards's claim that the
parties had an unsolemnized marriage pursuant to Utah Code
section 30-1-4.5. Richards next challenges the trial court's
order, which denied him an interest in the equity in Brown's home
and reimbursement for home maintenance expenses Richards incurred
while living with Brown. Finally, Richards contends that the
trial court improperly denied him the opportunity to conduct
adequate discovery by allowing Brown's motion for a protective
order. We reverse the order of partial summary judgment on the
unsolemnized marriage claim. We affirm the trial court's
decision in favor of Brown on the equitable claims and its entry
of a protective order.

BACKGROUND
%2 Richards and Brown lived together in Brown's home1 from May
1995 to September 2005.2 Although Richards proposed several
times, Brown never accepted, and thus, the parties never married,
They have one child (Daughter) , who was boriji in 1996.
%3 Throughout the relationship, the parties maintained separate
banking accounts but shared living expenses and costs associated
with Daughter. Over the ten-year period, Richards contributed
$71,100 to Brown's mortgage, initially paying $400 per month,
voluntarily increasing his monthly payment
birth of Daughter, and again voluntarily increasing his payment
to $650 in 2003. Brown's monthly mortgage payments varied,
starting at $1187 when Richards moved in anp. increasing to $1516
in 2003.3 Brown promised to treat Richards fairly and to give
him an interest in the home equity. Richarjds also testified that
Brown promised to put his name on the title to the home. Brown
conceded that she made these promises but maintained that they
were always conditional upon Richards first paying her one-half
of the existing equity and contributing to [the mortgage and other
expenses. Brown never indicated that she t nought of Richards as
a tenant, and she did not report his monthly payments as rental
income on her tax returns.4 The trial court found Richards's
testimony to be more credible than Brown's
14
The parties' remaining household and child expenses were
divided evenly. For most expenses, Brown t|allied the
1

Brown purchased the home in 1989 with her ex-husband. As
part of the divorce settlement in 1991, Brcjwn paid her ex-husband
$11,800 in exchange for his relinquishment 'of his interest in the
home.
2

The trial court found that Richards mbved out of Brown's
home in either August or September 2005. For purposes of our
review of the grant of partial summary judgment, we use the date
most favorable to Richards--September 2005.
3

The mortgage payments adjusted both ubward and downward
during the ten years of cohabitation. At least two increases
were attributable to Brown's equity withdrawals while refinancing
the home. Richards did not receive any portion of those
withdrawals, and on neither occasion did Brown add his name to
the title.
4

The parties filed separate tax returnls but strategically
allocated exemptions and deductions to maximize their refunds,
which they split equally.
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expenditures bimonthly and presented Richards with a bill for
one-half the costs, which he always "paid without question."
Occasionally, expenditures were not included in the bimonthly
tally, but the parties shared these expenses by alternating who
would pay for them. For example, Richards contributed over
$10,000 toward significant home improvements, including replacing
the deck, installing a swamp cooler and ceiling fan, and setting
up a sprinkler system. Richards also owned the only car, which
he used for his personal transportation, Daughter's
transportation, and family outings and errands. Brown did not
have a driver license and did not drive during the relationship.
%5 After Richards moved out of Brown's home in September 2 0 05,
the parties continued to socialize together through December
2 0 05, including celebrating Brown's and Richards's birthdays,
Thanksgiving, and Christmas as a family. In October 2005, the
parties engaged in mediation to resolve custody issues. The
parties also attended an education class for divorcing parents
and mailed a letter announcing their "divorce" to family and
friends.5 Although they initially intended to mediate the
property distribution, Brown later canceled that mediation.
Richards testified that he delayed filing a petition for
adjudication of unsolemnized marriage because he believed the
parties would either resolve the property dispute through
mediation or reconcile.6 By early 2006, Richards realized that
reconciliation was no longer a possibility.
%6
In December 2006, Richards filed a Verified Petition for
Paternity and Related Matters, in which he asked the court to
either recognize the parties as married pursuant to the
unsolemnized marriage statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5
(2007),7 or award him an equitable interest in Brown's home.
Brown filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the
unsolemnized marriage claim, arguing that Richards filed his
petition outside the one-year statute of repose. Following a
hearing, the domestic commissioner recommended that Brown's
motion for partial summary judgment be granted. The trial court
accepted the commissioner's recommendation because a
5

It is unclear from the record when the parties mailed the
letter.
it

6

Richards was also unaware that he had to file a petition to
have their relationship recognized as a legal marriage within one
year of the termination of the relationship.
7

We cite to the current codification of Utah Code section
30-1-4.5 because the current version is identical to the version
in effect when Richards filed the petition.
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"relationship [for purposes of unsolemnized marriage] i s
terminated by cessation of the [required e lament of]
cohabitation." The trial court concluded tljiat t h e r e was no
factual dispute that cohabitation had ended by September 2005,
and Richards's petition was filed over a ye^r later.
%1 The equitable claims were reserved for a bench trial. At
trial, Richards testified that Brown promised as early as
September 1996 to put his name on the title of the home.
Richards also indicated that at various poihts during the
relationship he "felt insecure about [his] financial position
. . . in the family" and that Brown "recognized that [insecurity]
. . . and she assured [him] on several occasions that [he could]
just take her word for it"--that she would treat him like she did
her ex-husband. Yet when Brown twice refinanced the house during
the relationship, she did not add Richards co the title.
Nevertheless, Richards failed to take any steps to ensure that he
was given legal interest in the home.8
f8
Richards also presented evidence that he contributed over
$12,000 to home improvements and an additional $2000 to home
maintenance over the ten-year period. The trial court concluded
that Brown had received a benefit equal to the cost of the
purchase and installation of the deck, swamb cooler, sprinkler
system, and ceiling fan. Accordingly, it oprdered Brown to
reimburse Richards $10,136 under an unjust (enrichment theory.
The trial court rejected, however, Richards!fs additional expenses
because it concluded that these expenses we re more appropriately
categorized as home maintenance expenditure s. The trial court
declined to reimburse Richards for his home maintenance
contributions because these expenses did not enhance the value of
the home in such a manner that it conferred "a specific benefit
upon [Brown] which in fairness she should be required to repay."
Brown asserts that she has paid Richards orj that judgment.9
8

Richards also testified that in 1999 pr 2000, in response
to his repeated requests to be added to thd title, Brown brought
home paperwork to refinance the house
Ridhards told her he
wanted to think about whether refinancing 4ade financial sense
for them. Two days later, the paperwork wa[s "gone." Despite the
sudden disappearance of the paperwork, Richards maintained that
the fact Brown brought home paperwork "gav^ [him] confidence that
[Brown] was interested in [his] financial 5>os:
ition."
9

Brown argues that because she has volfuntarily paid the
judgment and Richards has accepted it, the controversy is moot
and Richards has waived his right to appeal. See generally
Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 3442, 1143 (1973)
(continued.
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i[9
With respect to Richards's contributions to the mortgage,
the trial court concluded that Richards failed to establish the
amount of the benefit conferred upon Brown, leaving the trial
court unable to calculate the appropriate amount Richards should
be reimbursed under a theory of unjust enrichment. The trial
court likewise concluded that Richards failed to demonstrate the
reasonable reliance necessary to support a claim of promissory
estoppel. In addition, the trial court denied Richards's claim
of promissory estoppel on the grounds that he did not meet his
burden of proving the fact and amount of damages. Richards
appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
KlO The first question before us is whether the trial court
erred in determining that the relationship between Richards and
Brown terminated, and the statute of repose under the
unsolemnized marriage statute was triggered, as of the time that
Richards moved out of Brown's home in September 2005. We review
questions of statutory interpretation for correctness. See Jeffs
v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1241 (Utah 1998). We also review the
grant of summary judgment for correctness. See Forsberg v. Bovis
Lend Lease, Inc., 2008 UT App 146, % 7, 184 P.3d 610, cert,
denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008).
fll Richards next claims that even in the absence of an
unsolemnized marriage, he is entitled to recover his
contributions to the mortgage under the equitable theories of
unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. Claims based on
equitable doctrines "are mixed questions of fact and law." U.S.
Realty 86 Assocs. v. Security Inv.t Ltd., 2002 UT 14, 1 11, 40
P.3d 586. Accordingly, we defer to a trial court's factual
findings unless there is clear error but review its legal
conclusions for correctness. See Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1244.
However, because of the fact-intensive nature of equitable
doctrines, we grant the trial court broader discretion in
applying the law to the facts. See id. at 1245 (giving trial
court broad deference when reviewing claim of unjust enrichment);

9

(...continued)
(discussing general rule of mootness and waiver of appeal once
judgment has been voluntarily satisfied). We reject Brown's
argument because although Richards does not dispute that he
received payment, there is no satisfaction of judgment in the
record. See Hollingsworth v. Farmers Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 637, 639
(Utah 1982) (requiring the execution of a satisfaction of
judgment to moot a controversy).
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Department of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker vL Irizarrv, 945 P.2d
676, 678 (Utah 1997) (same for estoppel claim).
1[12 We review for an abuse of discretion ttie t r i a l c o u r t ' s
determination that Richards failed to introduce sufficient
evidence to establish damages, and we will hot overturn the trial
court's decision unless there was no reason^.ble basis for the
decision. See Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, 1 16, 994 P.2d
817 ("When a reasonable basis exists for thfe trial court's
[determination of] damages, this court will affirm the [trial
court's decision] on appeal."); Stevenett v Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 1 11, 977 P.2d 508 (" We review a court's
decision to remit a damages award based upo)i insufficiency of
evidence . . . for an abuse of discretion."
i[l3 Finally, Richards asserts that the trikl court improperly
granted Brown's request for a protective order, which limited his
ability to conduct discovery. "We review a district court's
ruling on a discovery issue for abuse of discretion." Menzies v.
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 1 59, 150 P.3d 480.
ANALYSIS
I.

Unsolemnized Marriage

1(14 Utah law recognizes an unsolemnized maJrriage as a legal and
valid marriage if a court determines that it arises out of a
contract between a man and a woman" who:
1) are "of legal age
and capable of giving consent"; (2) are " gaily capable of
entering a solemnized marriage under the p rjovisions of [title 30,
chapter 1]"; (3) "have cohabited"; (4) "mutual ly assume rights,
duties, and obligations" of marriage; and (|5) hold themselves out
as husband and wife and have acquired a reput ation as such. See
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (2007). Howe^e r, to have the
relationship established as a marriage, a j}etition for
declaration of marriage must be filed with the district court
during the relationship described by Utah Cfode section 30-14.5(1) or within one year of its terminati On
See id. § 30-14.5(2); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UTf 28, 1 30, 1 P.3d 1074
(interpreting subsection (2) of section 30 1-4.5 to require "the
filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within one year
after the termination of the relationship"
Kl5 The trial court ruled that Richards's claim under section
30-1-4.5 was barred by the running of the ^tatute of repose. In
reaching that decision, the trial court concluded first that the
date the parties ceased to cohabit was undisputed and second that
the relationship described in section 30-l44.5 ended on that
date. Because the petition to establish aif unsolemnized marriage

20080682-CA

6

was not filed within one year of the date the parties agree
Richards moved out of Brown's home, the trial court granted
partial summary judgment in favor of Brown.
A. There Are No Material Facts in Dispute As to When the Parties
Ceased to Cohabit.
%1G Relying on the Utah Supreme Courtfs decision in Clark v.
Clark, 2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538, Richards challenges the trial
court's summary judgment ruling. In Clark, the supreme court
reaffirmed the holding of In re Marriage of Gonzales, 2000 UT 28,
1 P.3d 1074, that an action to establish an unsolemnized marriage
under section 30-1-4.5 "is timely if filed within one year of the
termination of the relationship," even if the proceeding to have
the unsolemnized marriage legally established is not concluded by
that time. Clark, 2001 UT 44, H 11. Richards contends that, in
reaching its decision in Clark, the supreme court recognized that
the definition of cohabitation is not as precise as the one
employed by the trial court. Instead, Richards contends that the
Clark decision acknowledges the reality of conflicts in
relationships that may involve temporary separations. See id.
U 17 (relying on record evidence that established that the
parties had a brief period of separation during which the
partners continued to spend the night together on occasion,
exchanged expressions of love and affection, and shared expenses,
as evidence that there was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's finding of cohabitation). Thus, Richards contends
that it was inappropriate for the trial court to conclude as a
matter of law that cohabitation here ended at the time he moved
out of Brown's home. Instead, Richards asserts that he was
entitled to put on evidence concerning when cohabitation between
these parties ended.
i[l7 While we agree that the date upon which cohabitation ceases
may require a factual inquiry, thereby making summary judgment
unavailable, the record reflects that there was no factual
dispute raised by Richards on that point in the trial court. To
the contrary, Richards concedes in his statement of facts in his
response to the motion for partial summary judgment that M[t]he
parties have one child together . . . and cohabited for
approximately ten years from May 1995 until [Richards] moved out
of [Brown's] home in approximately September[] 2005." (Emphases
added.) Thus, in this case there were no material facts in
dispute on the question of when cohabitation ended. See
generally Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, % 53,
2 01 P.3d 966 ("When, as here, the moving party 'challenges an
element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to
the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to
establish a genuine issue of material fact.'" (quoting Eagar v.

20080682-CA

7

Burrows, 2008 UT 42, % 15, 191 P.3d 9)). Rkther than challenging
Brown's assertion that there was no genuine issue of material
fact in dispute, Richards conceded the factp that established
that cohabitation had ended.
B. The Relationship Terminates upon the FajLlure of One of the
Elements of Section 30-1-4.5(1).
118 Richards further argues that the termination of one element
required for a solemnized marriage under the unsolemnized
marriage statute does not determine when the relationship ends.
In support of that argument, Richards relies on the legislature's
use of the words "termination of that relationship" in subsection
(2) of section 30-1-4.5. According to Richards, the use of the
word "relationship" indicates that the legislature did not intend
for the termination of any one factor to automatically trigger
the statute of repose. Rather, he asserts, "a fair reading and
application of the statute is to allow a party to establish
termination on a case-by-case basis." Richards argues that his
position is supported by this court's statement in Hansen v.
Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), that "[n]o single
factor is determinative" in establishing an unsolemnized
marriage, see id. at 935. He contends that this must also mean
that the absence of one element does not automatically terminate
the relationship.
fl9 Richards misinterprets our opinion in fcansen. Following our
statement that " [n]o single factor is determinative," we said,
"Evidence of each element is essential [to establish an
unsolemnized marriage]." Id. In so stating, we recognized that
evidence of a single factor is not sufficient, alone, to create a
marriage-type relationship for purposes of the unsolemnized
marriage statute. See id. ("Although 'evidence of general
reputation, cohabitation, and assumption of marital rights and
duties would be evidence of consent,' such evidence 'standing
alone, would not be sufficient.1
'Section 30-1-4.5 requires
general reputation, cohabitation, and assumption of marital
obligations as separate elements in addition to consent.'"
(emphasis added) (quoting Whvte v. Blair" 885 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah
1994))). Consequently, the Hansen opinion does not support
Richards's argument that an unsolemnized relationship is not
terminated by the cessation of a single element identified by the
legislature.
1(2 0 Moreover, Richards' s position that theltrial court may
disregard the absence of one of the subsectjion (1) requirements
is belied by the language of the statute, To have an
unsolemnized relationship recognized as a l|egal and valid
marriage, a party must file a petition with| the district court
either "during the relationship described i|n Subsection (1) , or
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within one year following the termination of that relationship."
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (2007) (emphasis added). Subsection
(2)' s use of the word "that" in the second clause to modify the
word "relationship" references the phrase "the relationship
described in Subsection (1)," which is used in the previous
clause. Because "the relationship described in Subsection (1)"
is one comprised of five identified factors and joined by the
conjunctive "and," see id. § 30-1-4.5(1), we conclude that
termination of an unsolemnized marriage occurs at the time any
one of the statutory factors ceases to exist.10 See generally
DeLand v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
("We [must] assume the Legislature carefully and advisedly chose
the statute's words and phrases."). Indeed, we reached the same
conclusion in Kunz v. Kunz, 2006 UT App 151, 136 P.3d 1278. See
id. 1 4 0 (holding that the statute of repose began running when
the section 30-1-4.5(1) relationship ceased to exist by virtue of
husband's legal inability to enter into a solemnized marriage due
to his intervening legal marriage to another).
121 Our conclusion today establishes a rule from which the
deadline for seeking recognition of the relationship can be more
easily ascertained in most cases than the case-by-case approach
suggested by Richards. And we are not convinced that such an
approach is unfair to the participants because "the one-year time
limit of section 30-1-4.5(2) acts as a statute of repose" that
cannot be tolled. Id. f 21. Contrary to Richards's assertions
that he had only one year in which to establish the existence of
an unsolemnized marriage, either party to the relationship may
have it recognized as a legal marriage at any point during the
relationship and for one year thereafter. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-1-4.5(2); see also Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, % 25, 27 P.3d
538 (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result) (noting that "the
party seeking to establish the marriage was afforded an
opportunity to do so that began when the relationship with [his]
partner began, and ended one year after the termination of that
relationship"). Thus, Richards had up to eleven years during
which he could have had his relationship with Brown recognized as
a legal marriage, so long as all the statutory elements were
present.
C. Section 30-1-4.5 Does Not Require the Parties To Be Presently
Cohabiting.
10

Two of the factors contain requirements expressed in the
past tense. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (c), (e) (2007). As
will be discussed further in part I.e., requirements expressed in
the past tense do not technically cease and thus do not
automatically terminate the relationship for purposes of
triggering the statute of repose.

20080682-CA

9

f22 Notwithstanding our conclusion that thfe parties did not
cohabit after Richards moved to a new residence and that the
extinguishment of any one factor identified in subsection (1) may
render the relief provided by section 30-1-4.5 unavailable, we
agree with Richards that partial summary judgment was improperly
granted.
|23 In resolving any question concerning t|ie interpretation of a
statute, we begin with its plain language. See Utah Pep't of
Transp. v. Iversf 2009 UT 56, % 22 ("Our primary goal in
interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent
as evidenced by the plain language in light of the purpose the
statute was meant to achieve." (emphasis ana internal quotation
marks omitted)). As discussed, the statute! of repose in the
unsolemnized marriage act is triggered by the termination of a
section 30-1-4.5(1) relationship, which under some circumstances
may coincide with the extinguishment of a single element required
by subsection (1). However, the express language of the statute
anticipates that the element of cohabitation be treated
differently.
1[24

The unsolemnized marriage statute provides as follows:
(1) A marriage which is not solemhized
according to this chapter shall be legal and
valid if a court or administrative order
establishes that it arises out of| a contract
between a man and a woman who:
(a) are of legal age and capable of
giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of ehtering into
a solemnized marriage under this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital (rights,
duties, and obligations;
(e) who hold themselves out las and have
acquired a uniform and general reputation as
husband and wife.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (2007) (emphas|es added).
^[25 In listing the elements needed to create a relationship that
may be established as a legal marriage, the legislature used
different verb tenses for certain requirements. Compare id.
§ 30-1-4.5(1)(a)-(b) (requiring that the partners presently be of
legal age and capable of entering into a solemnized marriage),
with id. § 30-1-4.5(1) (c) (requiring only that the couple have
cohabited). We assume the legislature useq these different verb
tenses advisedly. See Houskeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, % 21, 197
P.3d 636 ("[W]hen examining the statutory language, we assume the
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legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its
ordinary meaning." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Unlike
in Kunz v. Kunz, 2006 UT App 151, 136 P.3d 1278, where the
husband could not meet the present tense requirement that he be
capable of entering into a solemnized marriage, id. H 29, the
parties here agree that they "have cohabited," see Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-1-4.5 (1) (c) . That is all that subsection (1) requires. See
id. Consequently, the date Richards moved out does not, as a
matter of law, determine when the relationship terminated by the
failure of one of the elements required by section 30-1-4.5(1).
f26 Instead, Richards was entitled to present evidence that,
despite his move from the home, the section 30-1-4.5(1)
relationship did not terminate until a later date. After the
trial court hears the evidence concerning the other elements
required by the statute, it must make findings of fact and
conclusions of law establishing when the relationship terminated.
In doing so, the trial court should consider the legislature's
direction found in the express language of subsection (l).11 If
the petition to establish an unsolemnized marriage was filed
within one year of that date, Richards is entitled to go forward
with his claim under section 30-1-4.5. Because there are
material issues of fact in dispute on the question of when the
relationship terminated, we reverse the trial court's partial
summary judgment decision and remand for further proceedings.
II.

Unjust Enrichment

%21 Even if he cannot establish an unsolemnized marriage,
Richards claims he is entitled to compensation under the theory
of unjust enrichment.12 The trial court rejected this theory,

"For example, the statute requires that the couple "hold
themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general
reputation as husband and wife." Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (e)
(2007). The first part of this element is stated in the present
tense and joined by the conjunction "and" to the general
reputation requirement, which is stated in the past tense.
Therefore, to have a relationship that falls within the
unsolemnized marriage statute, the parties must presently hold
themselves out as married and must have acquired a reputation as
such.
12

We do not address Richards's constructive trust or implied
contracts arguments because Richards abandoned these claims in
the trial court. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11, 10 P.3d
346 ("As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court
may not be raised on appeal.").
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concluding that Richards had not established the elements of
unjust enrichment. We agree.
A. Richards Must Establish the Value of An^ Benefit Conferred on
Brown to Recover Under a Theory of Unjust Enrichment.
^[28 To recover on a claim for unjust enrichment,13 Richards must
establish three elements:
(1) a benefit conferred on one person by
another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by
the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the
acceptance or retention by the conferee of
the benefit under such circumstances as to
make it inequitable for the conferee to
retain the benefit without payment of its
value.
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Richards bears the burden of proving
each of these elements. See id.; see also Desert Miriah, Inc. v.
B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, K 13, 12 P.3d 5^0 ("The plaintiff
must prove all three elements to sustain a claim of unjust
enrichment.").
^[29 "The first element of [unjust enrichment] requires the court
to measure the benefit conferred on the defendant by the
plaintiff." Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake
County, 2007 UT 72, f 26, 167 P.3d 1080; sefe also
_ Breitling Bros,
Constr., Inc. v. Utah Golden Spikers, Inc., 597 P.2d 869, 872
(Utah 197 9) (remanding where trial court fa led to resolve the
essential issue of whether the defendant "hit [d] in fact been
[benefitted] by the project carried out by pi aintiff"
As
explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Emergency Physicians
Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, 167 P.3d 1080,
"It is not enough that a benefit was conferi ed on the defendant,
rather, the enrichment to the defendant mus^ be unjust in that
omething for
the defendant received a true windfall or
nothing. 1 " Id. % 26 (quoting 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and
Implied Contracts § 13 (2001)). Furthermore, " [t]he benefit
conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiff's detriment or
the reasonable value of its services, is the measure of
recovery." Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamei:rica Inv . Mgmt
LLC,
413

Unjust enrichment is also known as cohtract implied in law
and is one branch of the doctrine of quantum meruit. See
Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT
72, 1 10, 167 P.3d 1080. The second branch of quantum meruit is
contract implied in fact, See id.
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2006 UT App 331, % 36, 153 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks
omitted). But see Emergency Physicians, 2007 UT 72, % 29
(holding that where the benefit is in the form of services, "the
measure of damages, by the great weight of authority, is the
reasonable value of the services rendered").
^[3 0 Thus, to prevail on his unjust enrichment claim, Richards
was required to establish that a benefit was conferred on Brown
and that it would be unjust for her to retain that benefit
without paying for it. The trial court concluded that Richards
"failed to carry his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that any portion of the $71,100 in payments he made to
[Brown] unjustly enriched her to his detriment." Richards
challenges that ruling on appeal, claiming that "unjust
enrichment analysis supports an award of equity accumulated over
ten years or reimbursement of the $71,100." (Emphasis omitted.)
We now discuss each of these theories.
B.

Richards Is Not Entitled to Reimbursement of the $71,100.

1(31 We first consider Richards's position that the entire
$71,100 he paid to Brown during the ten years he lived in her
home constitutes the amount it would be inequitable for her to
retain. As the trial court recognized, Richards received
something in return for those payments--a place to live. See
id. H 26 (stating that a claim of unjust enrichment requires that
the defendant receive "a true windfall or something for nothing"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). If Richards had not lived
with Brown, he would have incurred living expenses elsewhere.
Upon review of the evidence before it, the trial court concluded
that the amount Richards would have paid in rent over ten years
was roughly equal to what he paid to Brown. Consequently, the
trial court concluded that Brown was not unjustly enriched as a
result of those monthly payments because she provided Richards
with a place to live. See Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263,
1265, 1269-70 (Colo. 2000) (affirming the appellate court's
remand for the offset of any unjust enrichment to unmarried owner
of home by the reasonable rental value former partner received
while residing in the house).
1J32 Our review of the record reveals two possible sources of
evidence on this point. First, Brown charged a tenant $3 00 per
month in rent prior to 1995 to reside in the basement of the home
she subsequently shared with Richards. Second, Richards paid
$750 per month in rent in 2 008 for a home in the same
neighborhood that is roughly two thirds the size of Brown's
house. There was no direct evidence offered as to the actual
rental value of Brown's home at any point during the ten years at
issue. Consequently, the trial court compared the $3 0 0 per month
paid to rent Brown's basement prior to 1995 and the $750 per
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month Richards paid in 2008 for a smaller home, with Richards's
payments to Brown, which increased from $40(p in 1995 to $650 by
2003.
1[3 3 The record reflects that Richards bega](i residing with Brown
in May 1995 and relocated in September 2005 a period of 125
months. Thus, Richards paid an average of Approximately $569 per
month during that time. Where there was no more precise evidence
in the record, we defer to the trial court' finding that "the
amounts [Richards] contributed monthly [we] e in line with what
his rental costs would have been if he had ented a house or
apartment somewhere close-by to where his daughter was living."
On the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court
exceeded its broad discretion in finding theb amounts paid to
Brown roughly equal to the rental value of ^:he home the parties
shared. See generally Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244-45
(Utah 1998) (recognizing the fact-intensive nature of equitable
doctrines and granting the trial court broad discretion).
C. The Evidence in the Record Is Insuffici pnt to Determine the
Amount of Any Benefit to Brown in the Form f Increased Equity.
i[34 Alternatively, Richards argues that Br^wn was unjustly
enriched because while he paid half the mortgage Brown retained
all of the equity. He further contends that the value of that
benefit is equal to half the equity earned ^luring his time living
with Brown. Richards bears the burden of e tablishing both the
fact that equity was earned during the re levant time period and
the value of any unjust enrichment to Brown
See Desert Miriah,
Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, H 13, l£ P.3d 580 (requiring
that the plaintiff prove each element of unj ust enrichment).
^[3 5 Our review of the record reveals no eviLdence as to the
amount of equity in the home in May 1995, when Richards began
cohabiting with Brown, or in September 2005 when he moved.
Indeed, the only appraisal entered into evi tience was obtained in
March 2008, two and one-half years after Richards moved out of
Brown's home. Although that appraisal cone iuded that the home
was worth $425,000, it provides no informat (ion about what the
value of the home was in 1995 and 2 005--the dates needed for the
calculation of the change in equity during he relevant period.
i|3 6 Richards argues that this gap in the evidence can be filled
by extrapolating from the 2008 appraisal, He asserts that his
equity interest can be calculated by multiplying the 2008 equity
by 0.6 6 and then dividing that number in hat f. According to
Richards, the 0.66 represents the proportion of Brown's total
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ownership during which he resided in the home.14 Under this
calculation, Richards asserts that he is entitled to over $91,000
in damages.15 There are several problems with this approach.
1(3 7 First, even if we were to adopt Richardsf s methodology, we
would reject his 0.66 figure. Although Brown had owned the home
for fifteen years when Richards relocated, she continued to own
it at the time the 2008 appraisal was prepared. Thus, Richards's
ten-year occupancy would need to be compared to the eighteen
years Brown owned the property to calculate a percentage that is
relevant to the equity existing in 2008. Using those numbers,
Richards lived in the home with Brown for 55% of the time Brown
owned it as of the time of the 2008 appraisal.
i[3 8 Furthermore, Richards' s analysis relies on the assumption
that equity rises at a constant rate that never falls or varies.
However, home equity is not susceptible to a straight-line
calculation. The equity in a home is directly related to the
home's value at any given time. Home values are not stagnant,
nor do they always increase. Consequently, the calculation of
the increase or decrease in equity must be tailored to the
specific time period at issue. Brown owned the house for fiveand-a-half years prior to and two-and-half-years after Richards's
co-occupancy, during which time the value of the home could have
rapidly appreciated. Where the evidence necessary to quantify
any actual change in equity was absent from the record, the trial
court was not required to adopt Richards's assumption of
straight-line appreciation. Cf. Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436,
i[ 14, 131 P. 3d 252 (affirming trial court's exclusion of exhibit
using straight-line method of calculation where proper measure of
damages was the difference between the price of the stock on date
of purchase and the price of the stock on date of sale).
f39 In addition, Richards assumes that he paid 5 0% of the
mortgage for the entire ten years he cohabited with Brown. The
evidence does not support this assumption. In 1995, Richards
paid $400 toward Brown's $1187 monthly mortgage payment. This
equates to 34% of the mortgage. Even after Richards raised his
monthly payment to $550, Brown's mortgage obligation was $1500.
14

Richards claims that Brown owned the home for fifteen
years and he resided in her home for ten years. Ten divided by
fifteen equals approximately 0.66.
15

The 2008 equity in Brown's home was $277,000. Richards
claims the 1995 to 2005 equity can be calculated by multiplying
$277,000 by 0.66, which equals $182,820. Because Richards
believes he is entitled to half the equity, he divided $182,820
by two to calculate his share as $91,410.
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Thus, for that period, Richards made a 3 7% contribution to the
mortgage. In 2003, Brown's mortgage payment was $1516 and
Richards was paying her $650. At that time Richards was paying
While we
Brown 43% of the monthly mortgage obligati on
acknowledge that the amount of the mortgage fluctuated in part
due to Brown's refinancing transactions, thi record contained no
formula to determine the amount of any unju^ t enrichment.
1(4 0 Richards argues that the evidence is gcbod enough for a claim
in equity. While we agree with Richards that "[u]njust
enrichment must remain a flexible and workable doctrine," Jeffs
v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1245 (Utah 1998), that flexibility does
not excuse the plaintiff from establishing that, in fact, the
defendant has been unjustly enriched in some calculable amount.
For example, in Highland Construction Co. v Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984), the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's verdict of no cause of action where
the plaintiff failed to quantify its damages. See id. at 1044,
1052. The plaintiff had attempted to rely cpn a total costs
theory of damages, arguing that it was entitled to its total
expenditures on a construction job minus the amounts already
received. See id. The trial court refused to admit the total
costs evidence because it was not tied to any specific wrongful
conduct of the defendants and the plaintiff provided no other
evidence of damages at trial. See id. at lp45. Consequently,
the trial court ruled against the plaintiff due to a failure of
proof on damages. See id.
f41 On appeal, the Highland Construction plaintiff argued that
the damages should have been adequate for its causes of action,
including a claim for quantum meruit. See id. The supreme court
rejected this argument, stating,
It is true that some degree of uncertainty in
the evidence of damages will not relieve a
defendant from recompensing a wronged
plaintiff. However, it is also a general
rule of long standing that a plaintiff must
show damages by evidence of facts and not by
mere conclusions, and that the items of
damage must be established by substantial
evidence and not by conjecture.
Id. (citations omitted) . On the face of thjLs record, the trial
court did not exceed its discretion in refus ing to quantify the
benefit to Brown without substantial evident e.
%42 Nor are we convinced that the decision^ from other
jurisdictions upon which Richards relies hold otherwise. In
Tolan v. Kimball, 33 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2001J (per curiam), the
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Alaska Supreme Court, applying its standards for cohabiting
couples, enforced the intent of the parties to share the equity
in their residence equally. See id. at 1154-55. The court was
able to determine the amount of that award, however, because
there was evidence in the record that during the period of
cohabitation, "the property's [net] value increased from $66,000
to $168,000." Id. at 1153; see also Ulrich v. Zemke, 2002 WI App
246, H1 4-6, 10, 258 Wis. 2d 180, KU 4-6, 10, 654 N.W.2d 458,
%% 4-6, 10 (approving use of unjust enrichment theory to assess
the rights of a formerly cohabiting couple where the record
contained specific values for the various properties at issue
during the relevant time period).
143 Richards also relies on Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263
(Colo. 2 0 00), wherein the Colorado Supreme Court held that the
fact of cohabitation does not bar a suit in equity. See id. at
1269. In reaching that conclusion, the Salzman court cautioned,
[C]ohabitation and sexual relations alone do
not suspend contract and equity principles.
We do caution, however, that mere
cohabitation does not trigger any marital
rights. A court should not decline to
provide relief to parties in dispute merely
because their dispute arose in relationship
to cohabitation. Rather, the court should
determine, as with any other parties, whether
general contract laws and equitable rules
apply.
Id. at 1268-69 (footnote omitted); see also Flood v. Kalinvaprak,
2004 MT 15, 1M( 20-21, 319 Mont. 280, %% 20-21, 84 P.3d 27, KK 2021 (rejecting divorce analysis and using partition action to
divide property owned as tenants in common by unmarried former
cohabitants). We see nothing in the cases cited by Richards that
would have required the trial court to accept the damage theory
advanced simply because Richards asserted equitable claims.16
D. Brown Was Not Unjustly Enriched by Richards's Contributions
to Routine Maintenance.
f44 Richards also argues that Brown was unjustly enriched by his
contributions to home maintenance during the time they cohabited.
We disagree. The maintenance expenses did not materially benefit
16

Because we hold that the trial court did not exceed its
discretion in finding that Richards did not quantify the value of
any benefit to Brown, we need not address the other elements of
unjust enrichment.
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Brown by enhancing the overall value of the home. See Emergency
Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, % 26,
167 P.3d 1080 (noting that unjust enrichment requires that a
defendant receive more than an incidental benefit). Furthermore,
while maintenance was part of the necessary expense of occupying
the home, the improvements paid for by Richards added to its
future value. See generally Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d
389, 393 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (defining improvements as those
that "add to the value of or enhance the marketability of the
home" and maintenance as activities that are necessary for
maintaining a home but do not enhance its overall value). Thus,
Brown and Richards shared equally in the benefit from the
maintenance expenses while living together in the home. In
contrast, Brown continues to enjoy a benefit from the
improvements long after Richards vacated the premises. We agree
with the trial court that Brown has been unjustly enriched by the
improvements but not by the routine maintenance expenses.
III.

Promissory Estoppel

1[4 5 Richards argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
also entitles him to an interest in the home equity. Promissory
estoppel is "employed where injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise." Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213,
*h 22, 163 P. 3d 747. To make a claim of promissory estoppel,
proof of four elements must be shown:
(1) [Richards] acted with prudenc and in
reasonable reliance on a promise rjiade by
[Brown]; (2) [Brown] knew that [R chards]
relied on the promise which [Browiji] should
reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of [Richards ] . . . ;
(3) [Brown] was aware of all matei ial facts;
and (4) [Richards] relied on the promise and
the reliance resulted in a loss t [him] .
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, % 16, 158 P.3d
1088 (internal quotation marks omitted).
^[4 6 The trial court found that Brown, with knowledge of all
material facts, made a promise to Richards to "treat him
equitably," "that is, he would get an interest in his
contribution to the home." However, the trial court concluded
that Richards failed to meet his burden in proving the other two
elements. First, the court said, "[Richards] has not shown he
acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance . . . [on Brown's]
promise [to add Richards to the title] " because Brown had twice
refinanced the home without adding Richards s name to the title
and Richards had never taken serious initiative to have his name
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added. The trial court further concluded that even if Richards
had reasonably relied, he did not show any detriment as a result
of that reliance. Richards challenges both conclusions on
appeal.
1(47 Even if we were to assume that Richards's reliance on
Brown's promise was reasonable, he still must prove damages to
prevail on a claim of promissory estoppel. See Andreason v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
("An award of damages [on promissory estoppel] requires that a
plaintiff prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of the
evidence . . . . " ) .
"Damages in promissory estoppel are limited
to those which are sustained because the plaintiff[] ha[s]
changed [his] position to [his] detriment in reasonable reliance
upon the defendant's representation." Id. at 175. Generally, a
promise binding under promissory estoppel is enforced by awarding
the plaintiff his expectation damages. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 90 cmt. d (1981) ("[F]ull scale enforcement by
normal [contract] remedies is often appropriate.")/ id. § 347
(stating that the general measure of damages for breach of
contract is the expectation interest)/ see also Alta Health
Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mech. Serv., 930 P.2d 280, 284-85 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996) ("According to Utah contract law, . . . damages
[for breach] are properly measured by the amount necessary to
'place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the
contract had been performed.'" (citation omitted)). Sometimes,
the more equitable remedy under a theory of promissory estoppel
is reliance damages, or damages to return the plaintiff to the
position the plaintiff enjoyed before relying on the promise.
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. d & illustrations
(1981). The correct measure of damages in a particular case is a
question of law. See Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, 1 23, 7 P.3d
783. Accordingly, we consider whether Richards proved his
damages under both the expectation and reliance measures.
A.

The Record Does Not Support an Award of Expectation Damages.

14 8 If damages were calculated based on Richards's expectation,
he would be entitled to the value of the promise made, that is, a
fair interest in the equity. Due to the equitable nature of
promissory estoppel, the calculation of damages may be more
flexible than in typical contract cases. See Andreason, 848 P.2d
at 175-76, 178 (requiring damages to be based on a "case by case
calculation").
149 Despite the inherent flexibility in promissory estoppel
cases, damages still must be proved "with reasonable certainty."
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 (1981). The amount of
damages need not be established "with precision," Bastian v.
King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983), but, at a minimum,
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[Richards must] prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of
the evidence and the amount of damages by approximations and
projections that rise above mere speculation," Andreason, 848
P.2d at 176; accord 11 Corbin on Contracts § 56.16 (2005) ("In
order to be entitled to . . . damages . . . , the plaintiff must
lay a basis for a reasonable estimate of the extent of harm
caused by the breach.").
1(50 A brief review of the case law demonstrates this
distinction. In Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 848
P.2d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), for example, the court upheld an
award of damages on the plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim.
See id. at 178. There, the plaintiffs sued their insurance
company for failing to pay for repairs that,the insurance company
had instructed them to make. See id. at 173-74. At trial, the
plaintiffs presented detailed evidence of the amount of damages
by "meticulously testif[ying] from . . . personal written records
of expenses," which detailed the costs associated with the
specific items that, as instructed, the plaintiffs discarded and
replaced rather than repaired. Id. at 176. This court held that
the plaintiffs introduced "sufficient evidence to allow the
[fact-finder] to determine an entitlement to promissory estoppel
damages and to calculate their value." Id. (emphasis added).
151 On the other hand, in Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 709 P.2d ft30 (Utah 1985), the
plaintiff failed to meet his burden of show ng the amount of
damages where he only provided information c^n his business's lost
gross income instead of its lost net income
See id. at 336.
The supreme court held that " [p]roof of los of gross income only
is an insufficient foundation for proof of ^mount of damages" and
that, while the gross figures may have proven the fact that
damages existed, the net income figures we re necessary for the
court to approximate the actual amount of damagess. See id.
f52 Here, as noted earlier, Richards introduced evidence as to
the market value and equity that existed in the home in 2008, but
the record contained no evidence of the equity at the time he
moved into the home in 1995 or when he moved out in 2005.
Without those parameters, it is impossible to determine the
equity earned during the years Richards contributed to the
mortgage. Even if the 2008 estimate of the home's value and
equity had been sufficient to prove that damages actually
occurred, it does not establish an appropriate measure of the
amount of damages. See id. At best, the 2 008 estimate gave the
trial court a gross value from which to begin. See id. But, as
previously discussed, home values do not appreciate on a straight
line, and they may even decrease. Therefore, without any
evidence of the change in home equity from 1995 to 2 005, the
trial court lacked the net value it needed ^o approximate or
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calculate the amount of Richards's damages. Without that
evidence, we cannot hold that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in concluding that Richards did not establish the
amount of expectation damages to which he would have been
entitled.
B.

The Record Does Not Support an Award of Reliance Damages.

1(53 Alternatively, if Richards were entitled to reliance
damages, he would receive compensation sufficient to return him
to the same position he would be in had he not relied upon
Brown's promise. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 344,
349 (1981) . Damages would be limited to the amount Richards
expended in reliance on Brown's promise, less any loss that
Richards would have avoided if Brown had fully performed her
promise. See id. § 349; see also Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Damages in
promissory estoppel are limited to those which are sustained
because the plaintiff[] ha[s] changed [his] position to [his]
detriment in reasonable reliance upon the defendant's
representation."). In other words, Richards's compensation would
equal the difference between what he paid on Brown's mortgage and
what he would have paid to live somewhere else. As discussed
above, the trial court compared the rental value of Brown's
property and the home Richards rented after the parties ceased
cohabiting and concluded that the amount Richards would have paid
in rent over ten years was roughly equal to what he paid to
Brown.
i|54 Richards maintains that he is nevertheless entitled to any
equity he would have earned had he used the $71,100 to purchase
his own home instead of paying Brown. Richards might be entitled
to that equity under a reliance theory upon an appropriate
record. However, as the trial court held, Richards failed to
meet his burden of providing the court with evidence sufficient
to calculate how much that equity might be. There is no evidence
in the record showing the value of any home Richards could
purchase; what the total amount of that mortgage would be; what
the interest rate, monthly payments, and other terms of such a
mortgage would be; or any other facts that would show how much
equity Richards could have earned under his own mortgage. 17 As a
result, the trial court lacked any figures that would have
allowed it to approximate his reliance damages based on how much
his hypothetical equity might be. See generally Andreason, 84 8
P.2d at 176 (holding that the plaintiff has the burden of showing
17

The trial court would also have to assume that Richards
would have actually purchased his own home if he had not relied
on Brown's promise.

20080682-CA

21

"the amount of damages by approximations and projections that
rise above mere speculation"). Therefore, the trial court did
not exceed its discretion in holding that Richards did not meet
his burden of establishing his reliance damages. Thus, because
Richards failed to prove either expectation or reliance damages,
we agree with the trial court that he did npt establish a claim
of promissory estoppel.18
IV.

Protective Order

f55 Richards's final argument is that the trial court exceeded
its discretion in granting the protective order that limited his
ability to conduct discovery. The trial court granted the
protective order for two reasons. First, "the discovery was
propounded in violation of Utah [Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(d). '
Rule 26(d) prohibits a party from "seek[ing| discovery . . .
before the parties have met and conferred as required by [Rule
26(f)]." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d). Under rul^ 26(f), Richards's
counsel was responsible for scheduling the meeting. See id. R.
26(f). At the time Richards served Brown with his discovery
requests, his counsel had neither met with Brown's counsel nor
scheduled such a meeting. Further, even after the court's
express directive to Richards's counsel to pubmit a scheduling
order, counsel never did so.
1)56 Second, the trial court noted that tri 1 was less than two
weeks away and that Richards had submitted
Certificate of
Readiness for Trial one year earlier. In thi s certificate,
Richards's counsel stated, "Counsel has cornel eted all discovery.'
Cf. McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 396 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(refusing to consider the plaintiff's argument that he could
survive summary judgment had the trial courp allowed him more
time to conduct discovery when the plainti f had previously
filed two certificates indicating that all discovery was
complete). Under the facts of this case, we decline to conclude
that the trial court exceeded its discreti on in granting the
protective order.
Accordingly, we affirm bn this issue.

18

Because we affirm the trial court's conclusion that
Richards failed to prove damages, we need n<pt consider whether he
reasonably relied on Brown's promise.
19

Nothing in this opinion, however, shoiild be interpreted to
limit the trial court's discretion in allowing additional
discovery on the unsolemnized marriage clairjn, if it determines
such discovery is appropriate.
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CONCLUSION
ij57 An unsolemnized marriage requires that each of the five
statutory elements be present. The plain language of the statute
requires only that the couple have cohabited at some time.
Consequently, termination of the section 30-1-4.5 relationship
here may not have been coextensive with the date Richards moved
out of Brown's home. Because there are material, disputed facts
as to when the section 30-1-4.5 relationship terminated that must
be resolved to determine whether Richards's claim is barred by
the statute of repose, we reverse the trial court's entry of
partial summary judgment. With respect to Richards's equitable
claims, we affirm the trial court's ruling in favor of Brown
because the record is inadequate to prove damages. Finally, we
affirm the entry of the protective order.

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

f58

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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New York Miscellaneous Reports
ISTRIC v. NORCON ELECS. , INC., 00146892 (5-J9-2005)
2005 NY Slip Op 50677(D)
PAUL ISTRIC, Plaintiff, v. NORCON ELECTRONICS, tNC, NORCON
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., NORMAN SCHLAFF, GERRY SCHEER a^nd SCOTT SCHEER,
Defendant.
00146892
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings iCounty.
Decided May 9, 2005.

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicatedfc}ythe issuing court.)
ARLENE P. BLUTH, J.
Upon the foregoing cited papers and after argument, defendants
move by Order to Show Cause to modify the income execution issued
by plaintiff to delete therefrom the interest which has accrued
since the judgment was entered against defendant on May 9, 1997.
For the following reasons, defendants' motion is denied.
In deciding this motion, the Court cannot consider trie
opposition papers submitted by plaintiff, appearing prd se, as
they are unsworn and therefore inadmissible. See Rebecahi v.
Whitmore, 172 AD2d 600 [2nd Dept 1991] . Although his siibmission
is presented as an affirmation, plaintiff does not allege that he
is an attorney, doctor, dentist, or osteopath, whose affirmations
are admissible under CPLR § 2106.
While this case has a long history, for purposes of the instant
dispute, the relevant facts, as outlined in defendants' moving
papers, are as follows: On May 9, 1997, a judgment was entered
for plaintiff against Gerry Scheer and Scott Scheer in the amount
of $1,970 plus $225 in costs and disbursements, and $882.50 in
interest from June 22, 1992, for a total judgment amoun|t of
$3,077.50.
On July 10, 1997, defendants' counsel wrote to plaintiff, who
was and still is representing himself in this matter, ojffering to
pay the full amount of the judgment in exchange for a
"Satisfaction of Judgment in recordable form, as well ab a
Release." Defendants' attorneys did not include these documents
with that letter. On October 6, 1997, plaintiff served defendants
with a copy of the Judgment with Notice of Entry, with EL note
that included the following language: "I expect to receive from
you the release papers and other papers to be sign [sic] by me in
the near future, say two (2) weeks, otherwise I will be forced to
execute the Judgment through the Sheriff's office." In response,
defendants' counsel wrote to plaintiff on October 15, 1997 (more
than five months after judgment had been entered), advising
plaintiff that the firm was presently holding a check fpr
$3,077.50 in escrow, ffr*l| and stating that "[p]ursuant to
your letter of October 6, 1997, I have enclosed a Satis|paction of
Judgment and Release which need to be signed by you .
Upon my
receipt of these documents, I shall likewise hold them fin escrow
and immediately send you my attorney's check in payment of the
Judgment amount." The enclosed Release was a sweeping dbcument
releasing not only the judgment debtors Gerry Scheer anp Scott
Scheer, but also the other named defendants, Norcon Ele ptronics,
Inc., Norcon Communications, Inc., and Norman Schaff PfLaintiff

never responded to defendants' October 1997 correspondence, and
neither side followed up with the other
Plaintiff did not send the Sheriff to execute on the judgment
until more than seven years later. At oral argument, plaintiff
contended that the delay was due to his inability to obtain a
transcript of the judgment because the Court allegedly misplaced
the file, a claim defendants dispute. In any event, the income
execution served on defendants includes interest accrued on the
judgment since the date of entry, May 9, 1997. Defendants' motion
seeks to modify the income execution to delete therefrom all the
interest that has accrued since October 15, 1997 the date of
defendants' counsel's alleged second letter to plaintiff, which
defendants contend was a tender. If interest did not stop, then
as the date of this decision, May 9, 2005, the amount of interest
from the date of the judgment to the date of the decision is
$2,215.80
A defendant's unconditional tender of the amount due on a
judgment stops the running of postjudgment interest. See
Meiselman v. Allstate
Ins
Co , 197 AD2d.561, 602 NYS2d 659 [2nd
Dept 1993]. Defendants argue that their October 15, 1997 letter
constituted such a "tender" to plaintiff, and thereby tolled the
running of interest as of that date. Defendants' argument fails
for several reasons
First, defendants never actually sent the $3,077 50 to the
plaintiff An offer to send payment is not equivalent to sending
it. Since no money was sent, there was no tender.
Second, even if the defendants had sent the check for $3,077 50
to the plaintiff with their October 15th letter, it would not
have been the full amount then due because more than five months
of interest had already accrued on the judgment Interest on a
money judgment begins to run from the date of its entry. See
CPLR § 5003. Thus, plaintiff was entitled to the interest that
had accrued since May 9, 1997, which is calculated at nine
percent per year. See CPLR § 5004. To toll the running of
interest, a tender must include the full amount due See
Cafferty
v Scotti
Bros. Records,
Inc.,
B$9 F Sypp 193/ 204-05
[SDNY 1997]/ Gangen v Morrow, 303„AD2d 956, 757 „NYS2cf 422
[4th Dept 2003] (tender was not unconditional because it did not
include the interest, costs, and disbursements awarded by the
court). Therefore, even if defendants had sent the check for
$3,077 50, it would not have been sufficient
Third, the tender was not unconditional, and therefore was
ineffective to toll the running of interest. Defendants required
plaintiff to properly execute and return two documents before
they would pay the $3,077.50. The two documents, a satisfaction
of judgment (or satisfaction piece) and a general release, serve
different purposes, and each commands its own analysis
A satisfaction piece is comparable to an official receipt; it
is a statement acknowledging that the judgment has been satisfied
(either wholly or partially). It is filed with the clerk of court
and puts the world on notice that there is no longer an
outstanding judgment. Although it is the judgment creditor's
obligation to execute and file a satisfaction piece (CPLR §
5020) , the risk of making the payment and not getting a
satisfaction piece falls upon the judgment debtor.
The CPLR contemplates that there may be times when a judgment
debtor who has paid the judgment cannot get the satisfaction
piece, and provides that the judgment debtor may bring on a
motion pursuant to CPLR § SO21 for a court order satisfying the
judgment (fully or partially) as of record. There are also
consequences to a judgment creditor who refuses to issue a
satisfaction piece (See CPLR § 5020) This Court understands that
judgment debtors such as defendants herein would want to exchange

the money for the satisfaction piece; the judgment creditor is
obligated to give one anyway. However, if the judgment debtor
chooses to not pay the judgment until he receives a satisfaction
piece, then the interest will continue to accrue.
The condition of a general release is another matter [entirely
The judgment creditor has no obligation to execute a release, and
it is inappropriate for the judgment debtor to demand the very
broad protection ("from the beginning of the world to the date of
this release") of a general release. Although parties often
voluntarily exchange general releases in settlement, paying a
judgment is not a settlement, and a plaintiff/judgment creditor
would be well within his rights to refuse to generally release a
judgment debtor.£fri2| Therefore, even if defendants had sent
the correct amount of money to the plaintiff, the requirement of
a satisfaction piece and a general release made the offler
conditional, and did not toll the running of interest.
Accordingly, defendants' motion is denied.
This is the Decision and Order of the Court.
[fnl] Exhibit H to the moving papers is a copy of the ront and
back of Norcon's check to its lawyers, indicating Settlement of
Judgement [sic] on Istric Case," for the full amount oti the
judgment, which was deposited in the attorneys' IOLA Aqcount

[fn2] The Court notes that the general release submitted by
defendants included not only the two individual judgment debtors
as releasees, but also three other entities' Such an averbroad
condition would be yet another reason to deny defendants'
motion.
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Utah Statutes
TITLE 30 H U S B A N D A N D WIFE
CHAPTER 1 MARRIAGE

30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it
arises out of a contract between a man and a woman who:
(a) are of legal age and capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the
provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general
reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this
section must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or with:
one year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a
marriage recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and
may be proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other
cases.
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Rules of Civil Procedure
Rules of Civil Procedure

PART I, SCOPE OF RULES - ONE FORM OF ACTION

Rule 1. General provisions.
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern thfe procedure in the courts
of the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil
nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special
statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules promulgated by
this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule
81. They shall be liberally construed to secure tfie just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effebt on January 1, 1950; and
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or
effect. They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take
effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except
to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a
particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be feasible
or would work injustice, in which event the formejt: procedure applies.
(Amended effective January 1, 1987; November 1, 1&96; November 1, 1999;
amended effective April 1, 2003; amended effective April 1, 2008.)
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Rules of Civil Procedure
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Rules of Civil Procedure
PART VII, J U D G M E N T

Rule 58A. Entry of Judgment; Abstract
of Judgment.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict
of a jury.
Unless the court otherwise
directs and subject to Rule 54(b), the clerk shall promptly sign and file
the judgment upon the verdict of a jury. If there is a special verdict or a
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a
jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate judgment
which the clerk shall prompltly sign and file.
(b) Judgment
in other
cases.
Except as provided in Subdivision (a)
and Rule 55(b)(1), all judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed
with the clerk,
(c) When judgment
entered;
recording..
A judgment is complete and
shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on
real property, when it is signed and filed as provided in subdivisions (a)
or (b). The clerk shall immediately record the judgment in the register
of actions and the register of judgments.
(d) Notice
of judgment.
A copy of the signed judgment shall be
promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule
5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by this
requirement.
(e) Judgment
after
death
of a party.
If a party dies after a verdict or
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may
nevertheless entered.
(f) Judgment
by confession.
If a judgment by confession is
authorized by statute, the party seeking the judgment must file with the
clerk a statement, verified by the defendant, to the following effect:
(1) If the judgment is for money due or to become due, it shall concisely
state the claim and that the specified sum is due or to become due;
(2) If the judgment is for the purpose of securing the plaintiff
against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the specified sum does not exceed the liability;
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for the specified sum.
The clerk shall sign and file the judgment for the specified sum, with
costs of entry, if any, and record it in the register of actions and the
register of judgments.
(g) Abstract
of Judgment.
The clerk may abstract a judgment by
a signed writing under seal of the court that:
(1) Identifies the court, the case name, the case number, the judge or

clerk that signed the judgment, the date the judgment was signed, and the
date the judgment was recorded in the registry oif actions and the registry
of judgments;
(2) states whether the time for appeal has passed and whether an appeal
has been filed;
(3) states whether the judgment has been stayecjl and when the stay will
expire; and
(4) if the language of the judgment is known to the clerk, quotes
verbatim the operative language of the judgment or attaches a copy of
the judgment.
(Amended effective September 4, 1985; January 1, 1987; November 1, 1997;
effective Novmeber 1, 2009.)
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